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EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Professor of Law 
Case Western Reserve University 
The admissibility of expert testimony depends on sev-
eral factors: (1) the subject matter. of the testimony, (2) the 
qualifications of the expert, (3) the conformity of the evi-
dence to a generally accepted explanatory theory, and 
(4) whether the probative value of the testimony out-
weighs other considerations. See United States v. Amar-
al, 488 E2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973); State v. Chapple, 
135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208, 1218 (1983); lbn-Tamas v. 
United States, 407 A.2d 626, 632-39 (D.C. 1979), appeal 
on remand, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983). 
The fourth factor deals with the trial court's discretion 
to exclude evidence when its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by dangers of unfair prejudice, mislead-
ing the jury, confusion of issues, or considerations such 
as undue delay and needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 governs this is-
, sue. The standard that the appellate courts use to review 
;a trial court's decision under Rule 403 is an abuse of 
discretion. See 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's 
Evidence, 403[02] (1982). Although this standard grants 
the trial court wide discretion, this discretion is not limit-
ed. For example, in United States v. Dwyer, 539 F.2d 924 
(2d Cir. 1976), the accused's attempt to call a second ex-
pert to tesitify on an insanity defense was rejected by the 
trial court. The trial court, however, refused to explain the 
basis for its decision despite a defense request for an ex-
planation. The Second Circuit reversed: 
Although Rule 403 has placed great discretion in the trial 
judge, discretion does not mean immunity from accountabil-
ity .... Unfortunately, where the reasons for a discretionary 
ruling are not apparent to counsel, they will probably not be 
apparent to an appellate court. We therefore find it difficult 
to comprehend the district judge's adamant refusal to re-
spond to defense counsel's inquiries. The spirit of Rule 403 
would have been better served had the judge "confront[ed] 
the problem explicity, acknowledging and weighing both the 
prejudice and the probative worth" of the proffered testimo-
ny. /d. at 928. 
SUBJECT MATTER OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 
An expert may tesitfy only on a matter that is a proper 
subject for expert testimony. See J. Maguire, Evidence, 
Common Sense and Common Law 30 (1947) ("The field 
Public Defender: Hyman Friedman 
of expertness is bounded on one side by the great area 
of the common place, supposedly within the ken of every 
person of moderate intelligence, and on the other by the 
even greater area of the speculative and uncertain. Of 
course, both these boundaries constantly shift .... "). 
The trial court is entrusted with determining whether the 
testimony is a proper subject for an expert. As the Su-
preme Court has noted, the trial court has "broad discre-
tion in the matter of the admission or exclusion of expert 
evidence, and his action is to be sustained unless mani-
festly erroneous." Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 
U.S. 31, 35 (1962). 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that expert 
testimony is admissible if "scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to un-
derstand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." 
See generally 3D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evi-
dence§ 382 (1979); 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra , 
702 [01]. According to the federal drafters: 
The rule is broadly phrased. The fields of knowledge 
which may be drawn upon are not limited merely to the 
'scientific' and 'technical' but extend to all 'specialized' 
knowledge .... Thus within the scope of the rule are not 
only experts in the strictest sense of the word, e.g., physi-
cians, physicists, and architects, but also the large group 
sometimes called "skilled" witnesses, such as bankers or 
landowners testifying to land values. Advisory Committee's 
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
The standard adopted by Rule 702- whether expert 
testimony will "assist the trier of fact" - is a more liberal 
formulation of the subject matter requirement than that 
which is found in many common law opinions, which 
often phrased the requirement as whether the subject 
was beyond the comprehension of laymen. E.g, Fineberg 
v. United States, 393 F.2d 417, 421 (9th Cir. 1968) ("be-
yond the knowledge of the average layman") ; Jenkins v. 
United States, 307 F.2d 637, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ("beyond 
the ken of the average layman"). Under Rule 702, "the 
test is not whether the jury could reach some conclusion 
in the absence of the expert evidence, but whether the 
jury is qualified without such testimony 'to determine 
intelligently and to the best possible degree the particu-
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lar issue without enlightenment from those having a 
specializediH1del'stanclilig oftnfrsuojecr. .. : " State 
v. Chaple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208, 1219-20 
(1983). 
This test is consistent with Wigmore's formulation of 
the test for expert testimony: "On this subject can a 
jury receive from this person appreciable help?" 7 J. 
Wigmore,, Evidence § 1923, at 29 (Chadbourn rev. 
1978f See also Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 Vand. L. 
Rev. 414, 418 (1952): "There is no more certain test for 
determining when experts may be used than the com-
mon sense inquiry whether the untrained layman 
would. be qiJ~Iifi~gto g~t~rmin_e int~IJig~Qtly and to the 
best possible degree the particular issue without en-
. lightenment from· those having a specialized under-
standing of the subject involved in the dispute." 
The difference between fhEdwo standards can be 
illustrated by two examples. First, many courts have 
excluded expert testimony concerning the unreliability 
of eyewitness identifications because "the trustworthi-
ness in general of eyewitness observations [is] not 
beyond the ken of'~thefjuror.:c .. .'' State v. Porraro, 121 
R.I. 882, 892, 404 A.2d 4p5, 471 (1979). See also 
United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616; 641-42 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008 (1982); United States v. 
Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979); United States 
v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (9th Gir. 1973); Perry 
v. State, 277 Ark. 357, 370-71, 642 S.W.2d 865, 872 
(1982); Johnson v. State, 393 So.2d 1069, 1072 (Fla. 
1980); Commonwealth v. Francis, 390 Mass. 89, 453 
N.E.2d 1204, 1207-09 {198~); State v. Helterbridle, 301 
N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn. 1980). 
In State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 
(1983),-howevE)r; the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that 
the trial court had abused its discretion in excluding 
such testirn.OIJY~ inJighLoLthe.Jacts oUhat case. Ac-
cording to the court, "[e]ven assuming that jurors of 
ordinary education need no expert testimony to en-
lighten them to the danger of eyewitness identification, 
the offer of proof indicated that [the expert's] testimony 
would have informed the jury that there are many spe-
cific variables which affect the accuracy ()f identifica-
tion and which apply to the facts of this case." 660 
P.2d at 1220. See also United States v. Downing, 753 
F.2d 1224, 1231-32 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. 
Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1106-07 (6th Cir. 1984); People v. 
McDonald, 37 Cal.3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 721, 208 Cal. 
Rptr. 236, 248 (1984). 
A second ex<unple involves expert testimony con-
cerning the battered woman syndrome. The battered 
woman syndrome describes a pattern of violence in-
flicted on a woman by her mate. Typically, evidence of 
the syndrome is offered to a support a self-defense 
claim in a homicide prosecution of the woman for the 
death of her mate. Some courts have upheld the ex-
clusion of expert testimony on this issue because "the 
subject of the expert testimony is within the under-
standing of the jury." State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St.2d 
518, 521, 423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1981). 
In contrast, other courts have held this testimony 
admissible because it tends to explain two elements of 
the self-defense claim: (1) the woman's subjective fear 
of serious injury or death and (2) the reasonableness 
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of that belief. For example, the battered woman syn-
drome may explain why a battered woman has not left 
her mate. See State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 196, 478 A.2d 
364, 372 (1984) ("Only by understanding these unique 
pressures that force battered women to remain with 
their mates, despite their long-standing and reasona-
ble fear of severe bodily harm and the isolation that 
being a battered woman creates, can a battered wom-
an's state of mind be accurately and fairly under-
stood.''). According to these courts, the evidence 
supplies "an interpretation of the facts which differed 
from the ordinary lay perception ... .'' lbn-=l"amas v. 
United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634-35 (D.C. 1979), 
appeal on remand, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983). In so 
holding, these courts have taken the position that the 
test for admission is whether the expert testimony 
sheds light on a relevant issue which a lay person, 
without expert assistance, would not perceive from the 
evidence itself. /d. at 633. Accord Hawthorne v. State, 
408 So.2d 801, 806(Fia. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Smith v. 
State, 247 Ga. 612, 619, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683 (1981): 
State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 893-94 (Me. 1981). 
QUALIFICATIONS OF EXPERTS 
Federal Evidence Rule 702 provides that a witness 
may qualify as an expert by reason of "knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education.'' See generally 
3 D. Louise II & C. Mueller, supra, § 381; 3 J. Weinstein 
& M. Berger, super 1 702 [04]. The rule comports with 
Wigmore's view; he wrote that the witness' expertise 
"may have been attained, so far as legal rules go, in 
any way whatever; all the law requires is that it should ~ 
have been attained.'' 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 556, at '4 
751 (Chadbourn rev. 1979). 
Determining whether a witness is properly qualified 
is a matter entrusted to the trial court's discretion and 
thus is reviewable on appeal only for an abuse of dis-
cretion. See Fed. A. Evid. 104(a) ("Preliminary ques-
tions concerning the qualification of a person to be a 
witness ... shall be determined by the court. .. .''); 
Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35 
(1962) (trial court has "broad discretion in the matter 
of the admission or exclusion of expert evidence, and 
his action is to be sustained unless manifestly errone-
ous.''). Although the trial court is given wide latitude 
on this issue, there are certain recognized limitations 
on this discretion. For example, in reversing a trial 
court's ruling that a defense fingerprint expert was 
unqualified, the Sixth Circuit wrote: 
An expert need not have certificates of training, nor 
memberships in professional organizations .... Nor 
need he be, as the trial court apparently required, an 
outstanding practitioner in the field in which he profes-
ses expertise. Comparisons between his professional 
stature and the stature of witnesses for an opposing 
party may be made by the jury, if it becomes neces-
sary to decide which of two conflicting opinions to be-
lieve. But the only question for the trial judge who 
must decide whether or not to allow the jury to consid-
er a proffered expert's opinion is, "whether his knowl- l!ll 
edge of the subject matter is such that his opinion will , 
most likely assist the trier of fact in arriving at the 
truth." United States v. Barker, 553 F.2d 1013, 1024 
(6th Cir. 1977). 
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit reversed a trial court's 
ruling that psychologists were not qualified to testify 
on the issue of insanity because they lacked medical 
training. Jenkins v. United States, 307, F.2d 637, 643 
(D.C. Cir. 1962). The court, however, was careful to 
point out that a witness' qualifications must be based 
on the nature and extent of his knowledge and not on 
. his title. /d. at 644-45. On one hand, many psycholo-
gists would not be qualified to express an opinion on 
insanity because their "training and experience may 
not provide an adequate basis for their testimony." /d. 
at 644. On the other hand, other psychologists, be-
cause of their training and experience in the diagnosis 
and treatment of mental disorders, may be qualified. 
/d. 
Cour:ts also have recognized that experience alone 
may qualify a witness to express an opinion. For ex-
ample, an FBI agent is qualified to testify that a sub-
stance is cocaine based on four years of experience 
during which time he identified cocaine by sight on 35 
occasions and his identifications had been"confirmed 
by laboratory analysis in most cases. United States v. 
Bermudez, 526 F.2d 89, 97-98 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 425 U.S. 970 (1976). See a/so United States v. 
Johnson, 575 F.2d 1347, 1360-61 (5th Cir. 1978) (exper-
ier:JCed marijuana smoker qualified to testify that cer-
tain marijuana came from Columbia), cert. denied, 440 
U.S. 907 (1979); State v. Essick, 67 N.C. App. 697, 314 
S.E.2d 268, 270 (1984) (detective better qualified than 
jury to draw inference that vegetable matter was mari-
juana). But see People v. Park, 72 111.2d 203, 380 
-. N.E.2d 795 (1978) (deputy sheriff not qualified to iden-
ci1 tify marijuana). See generally DeFoor, Consumer Testi-
mony as Proof of Identity of the Controlled Substance 
in a Narcotics Case, 33 U.Fia. L. Rev. 682 (1981). 
Testimony by police experts on the modus operandi 
of various types of crime has also been admitted. See 
United States v. Burchfield, 719 F.2d 356, 358 (11th Cir. 
1983) (counterfeiting techniques); United States v. 
Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233, 1247 n.19 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1979); United States v. Scavo, 
593 F.2d 837, 843-44 (8th Cir. 1979) (bookmaking 
operations); United States v. Jackson, 425 F.2d 574, 
576-77 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (pickpocketing). See a/so United 
States v. Pugliese, 712 F.2d 1574, 1581 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(agent qualified to testify regarding typical character-
istics of heroin addicts). See generally Note, Police 
Expert Witnesses and the Ultimate Issue Rule, 44 La. 
L. Rev. 211 (1983). 
An expert's testimony must relate to the subject 
matter on which he is qualified. In other words, a 
witness may be qualified to express an opinion on one 
matter but not on another. For example, a criminologist 
may be qualified to testify that no fingerprints were 
found on an object but not qualified to testify that the 
absence of fingerprints resulted from the fact that 
gloves were used or that the prints were wiped away: 
"The government has failed to show that [the expert's] 
training qualifies him as an expert with respect to the 
1 reason no fingerprints were found .... " United States 
v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1240 (9th Cir. 1981). Similarly, 
a witness may be an expert on one aspect of a scien-
tific technique but not on other aspects. Accordingly, 
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courts must "differentiate between ability to operate an 
instrument or perform a test and the ability to make 
an interpretation drawn from use of the instrument." 
People v. King, 266 Cal. App.2d 437, 457, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 478, 491, (1968).~ For example, a police officer 
may be qualified to operate a breathalyzer but not 
qualified to interpret the results. See French v. State, 
484 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). The train-
ing and experience needed to perform these two dis-
tinct functions is very different. See State v. James, 68 
Ohio App. 2d 227, 229, 428 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1980) 
(state trooper qualified as an expert in the operation of 
intoxilyzer, but did not possess sufficient learning and 
knowledge to testify about effects of alcohol consump-
tion). 
BASES OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Expert witnesses are permitted to express opinions. 
As the drafters of the Federal Rules noted, however, 
an expert is not required to testify in the form of opin-
ions, and thus Federal Rule 702 provides that an ex-
pert may testify "in the form of an opinion or other-
wise." Accordingly, an expert "may give a dissertation 
or exposition of scientific or other principles relevant to 
the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the 
facts." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. A. Evid. 702. 
Expert opinion testimony may be based on three 
different types of facts in a particular case: (1) the 
expert's personal knowledge, (2) assumed facts sup-
ported by evidence in the record, typically in the form 
of a hypothetical question, and (3) information sup-
plied to the expert outside of the trial. Federal Rule 
703 recognizes all three sources; many jurisdictions 
do not recognize (3). See generally 3 D. Louisell & C. 
Mueller, supra, §§ 387-90; 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, 
supra, , 703 [01). 
Expert witnesses frequently express opinions based 
on their personal observations. For example, the foren-
sic chemist who examines a substance and concludes 
it is a controlled substance will express an opinion 
concerning the identity of the substance based on his 
firsthand knowledge. Similarly, the forensic pathologist 
who expresses an opinion about the cause of death in 
a homicide case, after conducting an autopsy, is bas-
ing his. opinion on personal observation. 
Hypothetical Questions 
Experts may also base their opinions on assumed 
facts that are supported by evidence in the record. In 
some jurisdictions, an expert who has attended the 
trial is permitted to assume that the evidence adduced 
at trial is true and express an opinion based on this 
evidence. See 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 681 (Chad-
bourn rev. 1979); C. McCormick, Evidence § 14 (3d ed. 
1984). The major deficiency of this procedure is that 
the jury may not understand which facts the expert is 
assuming to be true, a problem which is particularly 
pronounced in a long, complicated trial or where the 
evidence is conflicting. 
An expert also may express an opinion based on 
assumed facts that are stated in the form of a hypo-
thetical question. The hypothetical question has two 
principal advantages. First, it informs the jury of the 
facts upon which the expert's opinion is based. Sec-
ana, it provides the opposing party with an opportunity 
to object before an opinion is expressed, if the ques-
tion contains assumed facts which are not supported 
by evidence admitted at trial. Despite these advan-
tages, the hypothetical question has been criticized as 
a cumbersome and unwieldly device which often 
precludes the expert f~om fully explaining his opinion 
to the jury. As one court has noted, "[r]ather than 
inducing a clear expression of expert opinion and the 
basis for it, [the hypothetical question] inhibits the 
expert and forecloses him from explaining his reason-
ing in a manner that is intelligibl~ _to a jury." Rabata v. 
Dohner, 45 Wis.2d 111, 129, 172 N.W.2d 409, 417 
(1969). Federal Rule 703 permits an expert to give an 
opinion without resort to a hypothetical question, even 
if the expert lacks personal knowledge of the underly-
ing facts. 
If a hypothetical question is used to elicit expert 
opinion testimony, there may be an issue concerning 
the adequacy of the facts assumed in the hypothetical. 
There is a danger that the question will contain a one-
sided view of the relevant issues; for example, adverse 
facts may be omitted from the hypothetical question. 
In such a case the jury may give undue weight to the 
expert's opinion without fully appreciating the inade-
quacy of the underlying factual bases. Because of this 
problem, some jurisdictions require the hypothetical to 
include the "material" facts in the case. C. McCor-
mick, supra, at 37. Other jurisdictions reject this re-
quirement, leaving the opponent with the responsibility 
of highlighting such omissions in cross-examination or 
reformulating the hypothetical question to include the 
omitted-facts, /d. 
Non-Record Facts 
In addition, Rule 703 permits an expert to express 
an opinion based on information that has not been ad-
mitted at trial and, indeed, may be inadmissible: "If of 
a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the partic-
ular field in forming opinions or inference upon the 
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in 
evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 703. See also Soden v. 
Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d 498, 502-03 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(the inquiry under Rule 703 "must be made on a 
case-by-case basis and should focus on the reliability 
of the opinion and its foundation rather than on the 
fact that it was based, technically speaking, on hear-
say"). · 
This rule permits an expert to base his opinion on 
hearsay evidence. According to one court: "The ration-
ale in favor of the admissibility of expert testimony 
based on hearsay is that the expert is fully capable of 
judging for himself what is, or is not, a reliable basis 
for his opinion. This relates directly to one of the func-
tions of the expert witness, namely to lend his special 
expertise to the issue before him." United States v. 
Sims, 514 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 
U.S. 845 (1975). For example, in United States v. Arias, 
678 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 910 
(1982), a chemist, based on a comparison of quaa-
ludes seized from the defendants and quaaludes sup-
plied by DEA agents in Columbia, testified that the 
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seized quaaludeswere made by the same machine as 
the other tablets from Colombia. The defendants ob-
jected to this testimony on the ground that the expert's 
opinion regarding the origin of the sample tablet was 
based on hearsay. The court rejected the argument: 
"Under F.R.E. Rule 703 ... an expert may base his 
testimony upon the type of hearsay he would normally 
rely upon in the course of his work .... D.E.A. foren-
sic scientists rely upon agents in the field to submit 
samples and to establish their authenticity as is shown 
by the fact that the pill in question was catalogued 
and kept for sample use by the D.E.A." /d. at 1206. 
The admissibility of expert opinions based on non-
record facts raises several issues. First, how does the 
trial court determine what types of information are rea-
sonably relied upon in a particular field? The federal 
drafters provided little guidance on this issue. The Ad-
visory Committee's Note merely comments that the 
"opinion of an 'accidentologist' as to the point of 
impact in an automobile collision based on the state-
ments of bystanders" would not satisfy the require-
ment. While the court must decide whether there is 
reasonable reliance in a particular field, the rule does 
not permit the court to substitute its own notion of 
what reliance is reasonable. One court has written that 
the "proper inquiry is not what the court deems relia-
ble, but what experts in the relevant discipline deem it 
to be." Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. 
Co., 723 F.2d 238, 276 (3d Cir. 1983). The trial court, 
however, need not accept the testifying expert's view 
of what is reasonably relied upon by experts in a 
particular field. See Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler 
Corp., 569 F.2d 666, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
A second issue concerns how the jury may use the 
out-of-court information once it is admitted. Although 
Rule 703 permits an expert to base his opinion on 
hearsay information, it does not explicitly recognize a 
hearsay exception for this information. Under one 
view, the jury can consider the information only in 
evaluating the expert's opinion; it cannot use the infor-
mation substantively, i.e., for the truth of the assertions 
contained therein. See United States v. Sims, 514 F.2d 
147, 149-50 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 845 
(1975). See generally Carlson, Collision Course in Ex-
pert Testimony: Limitations on Affirmative Introduction 
of Underlying Data, 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. 234 (1984). 
Other authorities, however, envision the substantive 
use of the information, creating in effect another 
hearsay exception. C. McCormick, supra, at§ 324.2. 
See also M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence 
631 (1981) ("For most but not all practical purposes, 
Rule 703 operates as the equivalent of an additional 
exception to the rule against hearsay .... "). 
In criminal trials, the use of hearsay evidence as a 
basis for expert opinion testimony raises confrontation 
issues. In United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299 (7th 
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1150 (1982), the de-
fense objected to the testimony of a prosecution psy-
chiatrist who testified that the defendant was sane. 
The expert had limited personal contact with the de-
fendant and relied on hearsay information in formulat-
ing his opinion. The court ruled the testimony had 
been properly admitted. According to the court, reli-
. -----·- -···-··- ·--= 
ance on staff reports, interviews conducted by other 
psychiatrists, and background information from military 
and prosecutorial records was "clearly of the type that 
psychiatrists would rely upon in making a similar pro-
fessional judgment" and thus satisfied the require-
ments of Rule 703. /d. at 302. Although the court also 
rejected the defendant's confrontation argument, it 
recognized the cogency of that argument in certain 
circumstances: "An expert's testimony that was based 
entirely on hearsay reports, while it might satisfy Rule 
703, would nevertheless violate a defendant's constitu-
tional right to confront adverse witnesses. The Govern-
ment could not, for example, simply produce a witness 
who did nothing but summarize out-of-court statements 
by others." /d. at 302. See also United States v. Will-
iams, 447 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1971) (testimony of expert 
on .the value of land, based on documents and rec-
ords not admitted in evidence, did not violate the right 
of confrontation), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954 (1972); 
Stae v. Henderson, 554S.W. 2d 117 (Tenn. 1977) 
(admission of laboratory report through the testimony 
of the director of the laboratory violated confrontation 
right). 
In State v. Towne, 142 Vt. 241, 453 A.2d 1133 (1982), 
a prosecution expert testified that the defendant was 
sexually disturbed but not mentally ill. To support his 
opinion the expert cited a book, which had been writ-
ten by a friend of his. He also testified that he had 
spoken by telepnone with the author about the case 
and that the author agreed with his opinion. The Ver-
mont Supreme Court held that the expert's references 
to the author did not come within the rule allowing an 
expert to base his opinion upon facts not admissible 
in evidence but reasonably relied on by experts in the 
field. Instead, the court found that the witness was in 
effect " 'acting as a conduit' for the other doctor's 
opinion." /d. at 246, 453 A.2d at 1135. According to the 
court, not only was the opinion hearsay, but it also 
violated ,the defendant's right of confrontation. See 
Carlson, supra, at 248 ("For such support to come 
from a nontestifying expert insulated from cross-exami-
ation presents a difficult, almost impossible situation 
for the opponent of the evidence."). 
A related confrontation issue arises where a super-
vising chemist identifies a substance based, at least in 
part, on tests performed by other chemists. Several 
courts have upheld this practice if the supervising 
chemist testifies that the tests were perfomed under 
his personal supervision. See State v. Reardon, 172 
Conn. 593, 376 A.2d 65 (1977); State v. Ecklund, 30 
Wash. App. 313, 633 P.2d 933 (1981). See also United 
States v. Posey, 647 F.2d 1048, 1051 (10th Cir. 1981); 
Commonwealth v. Manning, 495 Pa. 652, 660-61, 435 
A.2d 1207, 1211-12 (1981) (testimony of supervising toxi-
cologist who identified PCP based on tests performed 
under his direction admitted); Commonwealth v. Gil-
liard, 300 Pa. Super. 469, 476, 446 A.2d 951, 954 
(1982) (testimony of medical examiner based on toxi-
cologist report admitted); State v. Kreck, 86 Wash.2d 
112, 542 P.2d 782 (1975). 
The issue, however, remains controversial. One fed-
eral district court has held that his practice violates 
the right of confrontation, but that case was subse-
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quently reversed on other grounds. Readon v. Man-
son, 491 F. Supp. 982 (D. Conn. 1980), rev'd on proce-
dural grounds, 644 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981). See also 
United States v. Coleman, 631 F.2d 908, 914-15 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980) (court declines to decide this "difficult" 
question); 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra, at 703-24 
("in a criminal case, even though Rule 703 does not 
prohibit the use of hearsay as a basis for an opinion, 
the constitutional right of confrontation may require 
that the defendant have the opportunity to cross exam-
ine the persons who prepared the underlying data on 
which the expert relies."). But see Ardoin v. State, 582 
S.W.2d 595 (Tex. App. 1984) (statute authorizes custo-
dian to testify about procedures used in test even 
though he did not conduct the test). 
DEGREE OF CERTITUDE 
Some jurisdicitons require an expert to express an 
opinion in terms of reasonable scientific probability or 
certainty. See generally 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1976 
(Chadbourn rev. 1978); Joseph, Less Than Certain 
Medical Testimony, 14 Trial 51 (Jan. 1978}; McElhaney, 
Expert Witnesses and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
28 Mercer L. Rev. 463, 477 (1977). For example, in 
State v. Holt, 17 Ohio St.2d 81, 246 N.E.2d 365 (1969), 
an expert, based on neutron activation analysis, testi-
fied that two hair samples were "similar and . . . likely 
to be from the same source:• /d. at 85, 246 N.E.2d at 
368. According to the Ohio Supreme Court, this testi-
mony did not satisfy the reasonable certainty or proba-
bility standard and thus was inadmissible. /d. at 86, 
246 N.E.2d at 368. 
The Holt case is wrong. Frequently, experts testify 
that two samples "could have come from the same 
source" or "were likely to be from the same source:' 
Such testimony meets the relevancy standard adopted 
by Federal Rule 401, and there is no requirement in 
the Federal Rules that an expert's opinion be ex-
pressed in terms of "probabilities." For example, in 
United States v. Cyphers, 553 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 843 (1977), the expert testified 
that hair samples found on items used in a robbery 
"could have come from the defendants." /d. at 1072. 
The defendants argued that the testimony was 
inadmissible because the expert did not express his 
opinion in terms of reasonable scientific certainty. The 
court wrote: "There is no such requirement. To the 
extent State v. Holt ... expresses a contrary view, we 
find it unpersuasive." /d. 
See also United States v. Oaxaca, 569 F.2d 518, 526 
(9th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 926 (1978) (expert's 
opinion regarding hair comparison admissible even 
though expert was less than certain); United States v. 
Spencer, 439 F.2d 1047, 1049 (2d Cir. 1971) (expert's 
opinion regarding handwriting comparison admissible 
even though expert did not make a positive identifica-
tion); United State v. Longfellow, 406 F.2d 415, 416 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 998 (1969) (expert's 
opinion regarding paint comparison admissible, even 
though expert did not make a positive identification); 
State v. Boyer, 406 So.2d 143, 148 (La. 1981) (reasona-
ble scientific certainty not required where expert testi-
fies concerning the presence of gunshot residue 
based on neutron activation analysis). 
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UlTIMATE ISSUE RUlE 
·:P:fc'~ht'-t"i·;;;e:-b6lii'TIIY~~~d'-exil~rt~~ll~esses were pro-
hibitea from expressing opinions on the ultimate is-
sues~irt;a~:QaSJ~;This rule was sometimes justified on 
the grounds that such opinions "invade the province 
of the jury" or "usurp the function of the jury." 
There _ar€} $eVE3Iat propi~!TI~_WiU:tth~ ultimate issue 
rule. First, difficult questions of application are in-
volved in distinguishing "ultimate facts" from other 
facts. C. McCormick, supra, § 12. Second, a witness 
cannot usurp the function of the jury because the jury 
is not bound to accept a witness' opinion, including 
tfie opinion· of ·an expert. 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 
1920 (Chadbourn rev. 1978) (ultimate issue rule criti-
cized as "a mere bit of empty rhetoric"). Finally, the 
ultimate issue rule provides an improper standard for 
determining the admissibility of expert testimony. The 
standard should be whether the opinion assists the 
trie-r of fact, not whether it relates to an ultimate issue. 
For example, in a forgery case the only contested is-
sue may be whether_ the defendant forged a check. A 
questioned document expert, because of his training 
and experience, may be able to answer that question. 
In such a case, an opinion on the "ultimate issue" is 
both desirable and necessary. The expert, however, 
would not be permitted to testify that the defendant 
was "guilty"; he may testify, however, that based on 
his examination the known· exemplars and the check 
were written by the same person. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 704, as originally enacted, 
abolished the ultimate ·issue prohibition. Federal Rule 
704(a) provides: "Except as provided in subdivision 
(b), testimony in the f()riT1 o.f €in opinion or inference 
otherwise-admissible is-not objectionable because it 
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier 
of fc'H::t:' See genera/1}13 o:Toilisell & C. Mueller, 
supra, §§ 394-95; 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra, , 
704 [01]. As the drafters point out, however, Rule 704 
does not open the door to all opinions on ultimate 
issues: 
The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the 
bars so as to admit all opinions. Under Rule 701 [lay 
opinions] and 702 [expert opinions], opinipns must be 
helpful to the trier of fact, and Rule 403 provides for ex-
clusion of evidence which wastes time. These provisions 
afford ample assurance against the admission of opinions 
which would merely tell the jury what result to reach .... 
They also stand ready to exclude opinions phrased in 
terms of inadequately explored legal criteria. Advisory 
Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 704. 
Accordingly, the federal courts have admitted expert 
opiilibri testimony regarding matters that could be con-
sidered "ultimate issues:' See United States v. Fleish-
man, 684 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 
U.S. 1044 (1982) (undercover agent permitted to testify 
that a person was acting as a "lookout"); United 
States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1246-47 (9th Cir. 
1980) (treating physician permitted to testify that a per-
son suffered serious bodily injury). See also United 
States v. Gutierrez, 576 F.2d 269, 275 {10th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 954 (1978) (caution should be exer-
cised before admitting opinions on ultimate issues in 
criminal cases). 
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In 1.~84 Congr(3SS amended Rule 704 by adding a 
new subdivision (b) to Rule 704: 
No expert witness testifying )Nith respect to the mental 
state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may ~~ 
state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant 
did or did not have the mental state or condition consti-
tuting an element of the crime charged or of a defense 
thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of 
fact alone. 
Thus, while Rule 704 generally abrogates the 
ultimate issue rule, a special exception applies in 
cases in which a defendant's mental condition is in 
issue - for example, where insanity is raised as a 
defense. 
EXPERIMENTS 
Expert testimony is often based on experiments, 
typically out-of-court experiments. Generally, testimony 
based on an out-of-court experiment is admissible if 
the experiment is conducted under the same or sub-
stantially similar circumstances as those involved in 
the case. See Robbins v. Whelan, 653 F.2d 47, 49-50 
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981); Jackson v. 
Fletcher, 647 F.2d 1020, 1026-27 (10th Cir. 1981); Hall 
v. General Motors Corp., 647 F.2d 175, 180-81 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980). 
For example, the results of tests conducted to deter-
mine muzzle-to-target distance have been admitted in 
cases involving rifles and handguns as well as shot-
guns. E.g., State v. Castagna, 170 Conn. 80, 90-91, 
364 A.2d 200, 206 (1976); People v. Carbona, 27 Ill. -
App.3d 988, 1004, 327 N.E.2d 546, 561 (1975), cert. Q 
denied, 424 U.S. 914 (1976); State v. Kahan, 268 S.C. 
240, 245-46, 233 S.E.2d 293, 294 (1977); State v. 
Brooks, 16 Wash. App. 535, 540, 557 P.2d 362, 366 
(1976); State v. Tourville, 295 S.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Mo. 1956), 
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1018 (1957); State v. Bates, 48 
Ohio St.2d 315, 321-22, 358 N.E.2d 584, 588-89 (1976), 
vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 910 (1978); An-
drews v. State, 555 P.2d 1079, 1083-84 (Okla. Grim. 
App. 1976). As one court has noted, the "results of 
tests to determine the distance from which a weapon 
had been fired are admissible into evidence provided 
the test was conducted under conditions sufficiently 
similar to the actual conditions involved in the case 
that they can be fairly said to have probative value 
and will enlighten, not confuse the jury." Andrews v. 
State, 555 P.2d 1079, 1083 (Okla. Grim. App. 1976). 
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the admissi-
bility of experimental evidence is governed by Rules 
401 to 403, namely, whether the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
misleading the jury. See generally 1 D. Louisell & C. 
Mueller, supra, § 103; C. McCormick, supra, §§ 202 & 
215; 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 445-60 (Chadbourn 
rev. 1979). 
lEARNED TREATISES 
Learned treatises are frequently used in conjunction tJ 
with expert testimony. See generally C. McCormick, 
supra, § 321; 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1690-1700 
(Chadbourn rev. 1976). In all jurisdictions an expert 
may be impeached with a learned treatise. There is, 
however, disagreement as to the conditions under 
which a treatise may be used for this purpose. Some 
jurisdictions allow this method of impeachment only 
when the expert relies on the treatise in reaching his 
opinion. Other jurisdictions permit impeachment if the 
expert recognizes the treatise as an authoritative work. 
Still other jurisdictions permit impeachment if the 
treatise is established as a recognized authority by 
any means, including the testimony of other experts or 
by judicial notice. See Advisory Committee's Note, R. 
Evid. 803(18). 
Under the traditional view, a learned treatise is 
admissible only for impeachment. Accordingly, the 
jury's use of a treatise as substantive evidence 
violates the hearsay rule. In contrast, Federal Rule of 
Evidence 803(18) recognizes a hearsay exception for 
learned treatises, thus permitting their substantive use. 
Fed. R. 803(18) provides: 
To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness 
upon cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct 
examination, statements contained in published treatises, 
periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medi-
cine, or other science or art, established as a reliable au-
thority by·the testimony or admission of the witness or by 
other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, 
the statements may be read into evidence but may not be 
received as exhibits.· 
See generally 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra, § 466; 
4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra, , 803(18)[01]. 
Accordin·g to the federal drafters, the "hearsay objec-
tion must be regarded as unimpressive when directed 
against treatises since a high standard of accuracy is 
engendered by various factors: the treatise is written 
primarily and impartially for professionals, subject to 
scrutiny and exposure for inaccuracy, with the reputa-
tion of the writer at stake:• Advisory Committee's Note, 
Fed. R. Evid. 803(18). 
There are two limitations recognized by the federal 
rule. First, a treatise may be used substantively only 
when an expert is on the stand. This requirement 
provides an important safeguard because it ensures 
that a knowledgeable person is available "to explain 
and assist in the application of the treatise .... " /d. 
Second, the treatise may be read to the jury but not 
received as an exhibit, thus precluding its misuse in 
the jury room. 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
The attorney-client privilege is designed to protect 
confidential communications between a client and his 
attorney. See generally C. McCormick, supra, §§ 87-97; 
2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra, §§ 207-13; 2 J. Wein-
stein & M. Berger, supra, 1 503 [01]; 8 J. Wigmore, Ev-
idence §§ 2290-2329 (McNaughton rev. 1961). As the 
Supreme Court has noted: "Its purpose is to encour-
age full and frank communication between attorneys 
and their clients and thereby promote broader public 
interests in the observance of law and administration 
of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal 
advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such 
advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer being 
fully informed by the client." Upjohn Co. v. United 
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States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). See also Fisher v. 
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) ("The purpose 
of the privilege is to encourage clients to make full 
disclosure to their attorneys."). 
Application of the attorney-client privilege to expert 
witnesses sometimes arises in scientific evidence 
cases. Two different uses of experts must be distin-
guished. First, an expert may be retained for the pur-
pose of testifying at trial. In this situation, the privilege 
is waived. See United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 
1046-47 (3d Cir. 1975); Pouncy v. State, 353 So.2d 640, 
642 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); State v. Mingo, 77 N.J. 
576, 584, 392 A.2d 590, 595 {1978). See also United 
States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975) ("Respon-
dent, by electing to present the investigator as a 
witness, waived the [work product] privilege with 
respect to matters covered in his testimony."). A "party 
ought not be permitted to thwart effective cross-exam-
ination of a material witness whom he will call at trial 
merely by invoking the attorney-client privilege to pro-
hibit pretrial discovery." Friedenthai, Discovery and 
Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 Stan. 
L. Rev. 455, 464-65 (1962). 
Second, an expert may be retained for the purpose 
of consultation; that is, to provide the attorney with in-
formation needed to determine whether a scientific de-
fense is feasible. If such an expert provides an adverse 
opinion and the defendant nevertheless desires to pro-
ceed with the defense, typically through the use of 
other experts, the question arises whether the attorn-
ey-client privilege precludes the prosecution from call-
ing the defense-retained expert as a government 
witness. See generally Saltzburg, Privileges and Pro-
fessionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 Va. L. Rev. 
597 (1980); Note, Protecting the Confidentiality of Pretri-
al Psychiatric DisClosures: A Survey of Standards, 51 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 409 (1976}. If the expert is a physician 
or psychotherapist, a separate privilege may be appli-
cable. Many jurisdictions recognize a physician-patient 
privilege and some recognize a psychotherapist-patient 
privilege. See generally 2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, 
supra, §§ 215-16; C. McCormick, supra, §§ 98-105; 2 J. 
Weinstein & M. Berger, supra ~ 504[01]. 
A number of courts have held that the attorney-
client privilege covers communications made to an 
attorney by an expert retained for the purpose of pro-
viding information necessary for proper representation. 
See United States v. Alvarerz, 519 F.2d 1036, 1046-47 
(3d Cir. 1975) (psychiatrist); United States v. Kovel, 296 
F.2d 918, 921-22 (2d Cir. 1961) (accountant); United 
States v. Layton, 90 F.R.D. 520, 525 (N.D. Cal. 1981); 
Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11, 13 (N.D. Ill. 
1972) (financial expert); Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 
784, 791 (Alaska 1979) (psychiatrist); People v. Lines, 
13 Cal. 3d 500, 514-15, 531 P.2d 793, 802-03, 119 Cal. 
Rptr. 225, 234-35 (1975); Pouncy v. State, 353 So.2d 
640, 642 (Fla. App. 1977); People v. Knippenberg, 66 
Ill. 2d 276, 283-84, 362 N.E.2d 681, 684 (1977) (investi-
gator); State v. Pratt, 284 Md. 516, 520-22, 398 A.2d 
421, 423-24 (1979) (psychiatrist); People v. Hilliker, 29 
Mich. App. 543, 546-47, 185 N.W.2d 831, 833-34 (1971); 
State v. Kociolek, 23 N.J. 400, 129 A.2d 417 (1957); 
State v. Hitopoulus, 299 S.C. 549, 309 S.E.2d 747 
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(19~~). §ee geDeil{l/ly Annat., 14 A,L.8.4th 594 (1982). 
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503 also ex-
tends the privilege to nontestifying experts. Subdivi-
sion (4)defines a representative of an attorney as 
"one employed to assist the lawyer in the rendition of 
professional legal ser\tices." The Advisory Committee's 
Note states that this "definition includes an expert em-
ployed to assist in rendering legal advice." Advisory 
Committee's Note, Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503, re-
printed in 51 F.R.D. 315, 363 (1975). The ABA Criminal 
Justice Mental Health Standards (1984) adopt the 
same position. Standard 7-3.3(b). The Standards 
restricts· prosecutorial· access· to the results·of de-
fense~initiated mental health evaluations of the defen-
dant whenever the defendant does not intend to call 
the expert as a witness. 
The argument supporting this rule rests on the attor-
ney's need to obtain expert advice. As one court has 
noted: "Only a foolhardy lawyer would determine tacti-
cal and evidentiary strategy in a case with psychiatric 
issues without the guidance and interpretation of psy-
chiatrists and others skilled in this field." United States 
ex rei. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1047 
(E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd.556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977). An attorney, however, might 
not seek such assistance if an expert's adverse opin-
ion could be introduced by the prosecution: "Breach-
ing the attorney-client privilege ... would have the 
effect of inhibiting the free exercise of a defense attor-
ney's informed judgment by confronting him with the 
likelihood that, in taking a step obviously crucial to his 
client's defense, he is creating a potential government 
witness who theretofore did not exist." State v. Pratt, 
28<!J-McC516,524;-·398 A2tl4'21, 426 (1979). 
Other courts have rejected the extension of. the 
attorlley~clie nf. privilege .. Tii .. tfiis ·context, .. altho'ugh their 
reasons vary. First, some courts limit the privilege to 
communications between the attorney and client. 
Under this view, experts and other agents are not 
covered by the privilege. E.g., State v. Carter, 641 
S.W.2d 54, 57 (Mo. 1982}, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 
(1983}. Second, some courts have held that the privi-
lege extends only to confidential communications and 
thus does not apply to experts who do not rely on the 
client's confidential communications in reaching their 
opinions. Under this view, a psychiatrist may be pro-
tected by the privilege but not a fingerprint or ques-
tioned document expert. See United States v. Pipkins, 
528 F.2d 559, 563-64 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 
952 (1976) (handwriting exemplars given to expert by 
attorney not within privilege); People v. Speck, 41 111.2d 
177, 200-01, 242 N.E.2d 208, 221 (1968). Third, some 
courts hold that the privilege is waived when the de" 
tense introduces scientific evidence. Accordingly, a 
defendant who raises~an insanity defense waives the 
privilege with respect to all psychiatrists who have ex-
amined the defendant. See State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 
54, 57 (Mo. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983); 
People v. Edney, 39 N.Y.2d 620, 624-25, 350 N.E.2d 
400, 402-03, 385 N.Y.S.2d 23, 25-26 (1976). But see 
United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1046 (3d Cir. 
1975); Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784, 791 (Alaska 
1979); State v. Pratt, 284 Md. 516, 522, 398 A.2d 421, 
424. '1919) ... '" ...•. ' ..•. 
In addition to the attorney-client privilege, defen-
dants have argued that the Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel precludes the use of 
defense-retained experts by the prosecution. Several 
courts have acc;::epted this argument: 
A defense .attorney should be completely free and unfei-
tered in making a decision as fundamental as that con-
cerning the retenti.on of an expert to assist him. Reliance 
upon the. confidentiality of an expert's advice itself is a 
crucial aspect of a defense attorney's ability to consult 
with and advise his client. If the confidentiality of that 
advice cannot be anticipated, the attorney might well 
forgo seeking such assistance, to the consequent detri-
ment of his client's cause. State v. Mingo, 77 N.J. 576, 
587, 392 A.2d 590, 595 (1978) (handwriting expert). 
See also United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1046 
(3d Cir. 1975); People v. Knippenberg, 66 111.2d 276, 
283-85, 362 N.E.2d 681, 684-85 (1977). 
Notwithstanding the persuasiveness of this argu-
ment; other courts have rejected it. See Noggle v. 
Marshall, 706 F.2d 1408, 1414-15 (6th Cir. 1983); 
Granviel v. Estelle,· 655 F.2d 673, 683 (5th Cir. 1981), 
cert~.ctenied,455.U.S. 1003 (19B2); United States ex 
rei. Edney v. ·smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1054-55 
(E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977); State v. Craney, 347 
N.W.2d 668, 67~77 (Iowa); cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 255 
(1984); State v. Dodis, 314 N.W.2d 233, 240-41 (Minn. 
1982); State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54, 59 (Mo. 1982), 
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983). 
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